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Is Board Gender Diversity a Driver of CEO Compensation?: 
Examining the Leadership Style of Institutional Women Directors 
 
Abstract 
In this investigation, we aim at examining the influence of institutional female directors on 
CEO compensation. Concretely, we investigate the impact of institutional female directors as 
a whole, differentiating also whether institutional female directors have business ties with the 
firm where they sit on boards (pressure-sensitive female directors) and do not have business 
links (pressure-resistant female directors). We hypothesize that there is a nonlinear 
association, concretely quadratic, between institutional, pressure-resistant and pressure-
sensitive female directors on boards and CEO compensation. Our findings show that CEO 
compensation decreases at low levels of institutional female directors and pressure-resistant 
female directors on boards, but when their presence on boards increases, CEO compensation 
also increases. We also find that CEO compensation is not affected by pressure-sensitive 
female directors on boards. Hence, these findings support the premise that institutional 
female directors on boards cannot be considered a homogeneous group and play an important 
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Past research (O’Reilly & Main, 2010; Reddy, Abidin, & You, 2015) provides 
evidence that corporate governance mechanisms influence CEO compensation. Some 
scholars suggest that CEO compensation may help to reduce the agency conflicts between 
executives and shareholders (Spraggon & Bodolica, 2011; Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-
Mejia, 2000) and may resolve problems associated with monitoring executives (Sanders & 
Carpenter, 1998).  
In civil law countries like Spain, where investor protection law is weak, the main 
agency problem in firms is the expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth by large 
shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), board system is one-tier (all directors, non-executive 
and executives make up one board) and there is a high ownership concentration, listed firms 
are characterized by the highest presence of controlling shareholders on corporate boards, 
known as institutional investors, which is in contrast with the Anglo-American context, 
where it is less common that institutional investors appoint directors for the board. In this 
line, Heidrick and Struggles (2011) report that directors appointed by institutional investors 
account for 40 per cent of directorship in Spain, while they only account for 2 per cent of 
British firms’ directorships. Institutional directors on boards, who represent institutional 
investors considered dominant shareholders, play a significant role on boards since they 
maximise the interests of their shareholders.  
Institutional directors, due to their different capacity to connect in corporate 
governance and their different attitudes toward the problems of governance in firms, cannot 
be considered a monolithic group. In this sense, and based on Almazán, Hartzell, and Starks 
(2005), Chen, Harford, and Li (2007), Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca (2014), among 
others, institutional directors can be differentiated between pressure-sensitive directors (they 
maintain business relationships with the company on whose boards they sit representing 
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banks and insurance companies) and pressure-resistant directors (they have no potential 
business relationship with the companies in which they hold a directorship representing 
investment, pension and mutual funds ). Therefore, directors representing institutional 
investors are likely not to show a homogeneous behavior and may take different decisions, 
depending on the characteristics of the institutional investors they represent on boards. 
Previous research also highlights the role played by gender diversity on corporate 
governance (Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009), focusing on the improvement of the 
supervisory function and the decision-making efficiency of the board (Lucas-Pérez, Mínguez-
Vera, Baixauli-Soler, Martín-Ugedo, & Sánchez-Marín, 2015; Nielsen & Huse, 2010). 
According to past literature, institutional female directors have an important influence on 
earnings quality (Johnson & Greening, 1999) and investment opportunities (Loukil & Yousfi, 
2015). However, academic literature on CEO compensation has paid little attention to female 
directors, and particularly institutional female directors.  
Thus, the goal of this study is to analyze how institutional female directors on boards 
impact on CEO compensation. Furthermore, we also analyze this relationship making a 
distinction between pressure-sensitive institutional female directors and pressure-resistant 
institutional female directors.  
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. Firstly, our findings support 
the thesis that institutional female directors cannot be considered a uniform group in line with 
past literature (Almazán et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007). Thus, this study extends previous 
research about the role of institutional investors in Spain, a context where the proportion of 
institutional investors on boards is higher than other countries such as the UK and US. 
Secondly, we find evidence that institutional female directors are more effective on boards 
than independent directors, affecting the governance system. Hence, we contribute to the 
corporate governance literature by demonstrating that effective institutional structures play an 
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important role in managerial monitoring and remuneration policies and, thus, affect the 
association between institutional female directors and CEO compensation. Third, we provide 
empirical evidence that there is a curvilinear relationship between institutional female 
directors and CEO compensation. In Spanish firms, the contest hypothesis prevails when the 
companies are characterized by low levels of institutional female directors and pressure-
resistant female directors on boards, while at high levels, the collusion hypothesis prevails. 
Fourth, our study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to analyze, in a Spanish context, 
the relationship between pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive institutional female 
directors on boards and CEO compensation. This paper may be considered a tool to explain 
the overall relationship between Spanish institutional female directors and CEO 
compensation, depending on the nature of their relationships with firms, since it provides a 
deeper understanding of the role of institutional female directors on CEO compensation.  
The Spanish setting offers a relevant opportunity to explore the impact of institutional 
women directors on CEO compensation, given the characteristics of the corporate governance 
system and the strong influence of remuneration practices between firms. The Spanish 
Conthe Code or Unified Code of Corporate Governance (CUBG, 2006) published in 2006, 
and updated in 2015, helped to regulate or recommend the presence of female directors in 
decision-making bodies. To improve the low presence of female directors on boards, the 
Spanish parliament approved the Act 3/2007 on 22 March 2007, which called for Effective 
Equality between Women and Men (LOIMH, 2007), which recommended that the Spanish 
boards of listed companies reached a gender quota of 40% by 2015. Given that listed firms 
have not yet reached this quota, the Conthe Code (CUBG, 2015) recommends that the female 
presence on corporate boards should be at least 30% before 2020 (see Moon, Chun, Kim, & 
Kim, 2008).  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, we 
describe the theoretical background and hypotheses and Section 3 provides the empirical 
design. Section 4 describes our results, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
Theoretical background and hypotheses 
Agency theory posits that the separation between the principal (shareholders) and the 
agent (managers and directors) of the firm generates information asymmetries between the 
parties, generating agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To mitigate agency 
problems, owners have used compensation policy as a mechanism to monitor executives and 
align their interests with those of the company (Dong & Ozkan, 2008). Thus, companies 
elaborate an efficient compensation policy in order to motivate managers and directors.  
The shareholders’ main watchdog in the companies is the board, which is responsible 
for supervising the most important corporate decisions such as the design of executive 
remunerations (Jensen & Murphy, 1990), and is a relevant mechanism to oversight 
managerial actions (Fama & Jensen, 1983) and to improve the effectiveness of board 
monitoring. The non-executive directors (outside directors) will act independently from the 
executive directors (inside directors) and will act as good monitors for shareholders’ interests 
(Armstrong, Guay, & Weber, 2010). Given that managers are often driven by their self-
interests, large shareholders, such as institutional investors, can monitor managerial action, 
thus reducing the agency conflicts and the necessity to grant long-term incentives to align 
interests between managers and shareholders (Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999). 
Institutional directors on boards have become to play an active role in monitoring 
managers in contrast to the passive role performed traditionally by them. Concretely, they 
have been considered a key mechanism to improve corporate performance (Agarwal, Erel, 
Ferreira, & Matos, 2011), monitor management behavior (Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999) 
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and control excessive compensations (Gillan & Starks, 2000; Hartzell & Starks, 2003). In this 
line, institutional directors have the motivation, expertise, resources and duty to monitor CEO 
compensation. Thus, institutional investors provide better governance in setting a 
compensation policy than do smaller investors.  
Prior evidence of the impact of institutional directors on CEO compensation is mixed. 
Some authors (Almazán et al., 2005; Conyon, 2014) show that institutional investors reduce 
CEO remuneration due to the fact that they are effective in monitoring management behavior 
and, as a consequence, are not sensible to the management incentive problem and cannot 
adopt more aggressive compensation, while Balasubramanian, Barua, and Karthik (2015), 
Chen, Yi, and Lin (2013), Croci, Gonenc and Ozkan (2012) and Kang and Liu (2008) report a 
positive influence on CEO compensation, as institutional investors attempt to align the 
interests of CEOs and shareholders by offering high CEO compensation. Overpaid CEOs will 
be incentivized to do the best for the firm taking steps to increase firm value for shareholders. 
In this way, the interests of CEOs and shareholders will go in the same direction (e.g., 
Pattarin, Alon, & Zhang, 2011).  
Agency approach also argues that females on boards might monitor management team 
(Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010), reducing information asymmetries and agency 
costs (Wellalage & Locke, 2013). In this respect, past literature finds women directors such 
as institutional female directors affect corporate performance (Pucheta-Martínez, Bel-Oms, & 
Olcina-Sempere, 2016) and dividend payment (Van Pelt 2013), among others. Hence, board 
gender diversity may also affect executive compensation (Lucas-Pérez et al., 2015; O’Reilly 
& Main, 2012).  
In this sense, authors like Bugeja, Matolcsy and Spiropoulos (2016), among others, 
demonstrate a negative relationship between female directors on compensation committees 
and CEO pay. This supports the thesis that institutional female directors on boards may 
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influence negatively CEO compensation because they are more risk averse in financial 
decision-making (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999), bring different perspectives to the 
boardroom, and develop a more trusting leadership style than men (Trinidad & Normore, 
2005). Therefore, the presence of female directors on boards reduces opportunistic behaviors 
and exercises greater control over CEO pay. Female directors are more rigorous in 
monitoring activities and may not accept an excess of executive compensation in firms. 
Nevertheless, there are some aspects of female directors that could increase CEO 
compensation. In this sense, O’Reilly and Main (2010) show that female directors are more 
generous and have less business experience and background than male directors; therefore, 
they can be convinced by CEOs to award more remuneration. According to this evidence, the 
presence of institutional female directors on boards may influence board decisions, such as 
increasing CEO compensation and, consequently, the monitoring role of female directors 
may be less effective. Therefore, it may support the idea that institutional female directors 
have a positive impact on CEO compensation because female directors may have problems 
with primary decision-making regarding certain issues such as executive compensation. 
Knott (2015), O’Reilly and Main (2010) and O’Reilly and Main (2012) find that female 
directors on corporate boards impact positively on CEO compensation.  
Hence, whereas the monitoring hypothesis (a negative relation between institutional 
directors and CEO compensation) is supported by Almazán et al. (2005) and Khan, 
Dharwadkar and Brandes (2005), among others, the entrenchment hypothesis (a positive 
relation between institutional directors and CEO compensation) is evidenced by Croci et al. 
(2012) and Feng, Ghosh and He (2010). Nevertheless, unlike previous literature that 
demonstrates a linear relationship between institutional directors and CEO compensation, 
Brewer (1991) puts forward the theory of optimal distinctiveness, according to which, both 
low and high percentages of demographic features (gender diversity and institutional 
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directors) within a collective (board of directors) result in more negative effects (increases in 
CEO compensation), while more positive effects (decreases in CEO compensation) can occur 
when a balanced proportion of features exists, which support a non-linear association, 
concretely quadratic. This suggests that the impact of group structure is probably to be non-
linear.  
Consistent with this idea is the social identity approach, which posits that when a 
heterogeneous group interacts within a collective (a board) may affect group outcomes due to 
coalitions, alliances, disputes or disagreements, among others. Board gender diversity can be 
considered a demographic characteristic that individuals employ with the purpose of 
classifying themselves and others into social collectives: in-group (the same demographic 
collective share the board of directors) or out-group (dissimilar demographic collectives share 
the board of directors) members, and when individuals are out-group have more difficult to 
join in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 2004). Furthermore, psychological and social identity 
perspectives argue that in-group individuals might consider themselves greater than out-
group individuals and, therefore, the behavior of in-group individuals in relation to out-group 
individuals will be unfavorable. These theoretical approaches posit that there is an interaction 
between the members of their own identity group rather than out-group members, since the 
members of intergroup are considered more trustworthy, honest and cooperative and tend to 
assess the competencies and abilities of their individuals more positively than the out-group 
members (Kramer, 1991; Tajfel, 1982). Joshi and Jackson (2003) also demonstrated that in-
group members behave in a more cooperative way because they tend to share interest and 
objectives. Thus, as the presence of institutional female directors increases on boards, they 
will make up an in-group in order to behave in a supportive way, improving intergroup 
cohesion and decreasing intergroup disagreement. This constructive intergroup interaction 
may impact negatively on CEO pay (positive outcome).  
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However, cooperative behaviors among directors may change to competitive 
behaviors and, as a consequence, might appear conflicts when directors are classified as in- or 
out-group (Joshi & Jackson, 2003). The differences between groups may generate negative 
behaviors in members of a low-status group (gender diversity or ethnic minorities) about their 
collective identity (Hornsey &d Hogg, 1999). These adverse behaviors cause problems in the 
in-group interactions and, consequently, it may lead to a decrease of firm value or an increase 
in CEO compensation. Thus, there will be a tipping point that will change the correlation of 
internal aspects of the board, causing the intergroup conflict of board members to have an 
influence (Ali, Ng, & Kulik, 2014). Beyond this critical point, the addition of more 
institutional female directors within the same group (boards) with different personalities and 
social competences could cause divergent processes and dissatisfaction with the organization, 
resulting in a negative outcome (increases on CEO pay).  
We extend this view to the relationship between institutional women directors and 
CEO compensation. Thus, as the proportion of institutional female directors on boards 
augments, CEO compensation will reduce (positive consequence), but when the presence of 
institutional female directors exceeds a certain threshold, the inclusion of additional 
institutional women directors on boards will increase CEO pay (negative consequence). 
Consequently, this premise suggests that there is a non-linear association, concretely 
curvilinear, between institutional women directors and CEO remuneration.  
Prior research, to the best of our knowledge, has not hypothesized a non-linear 
relationship between institutional female directors and CEO pay. Hence, based on the above 
arguments and extending them to board gender diversity, we expect a non-linear relationship 
between institutional women directors on boards and CEO compensation and, accordingly, 
we pose the following hypothesis: 
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H1: CEO pay is negatively affected by institutional women directors on boards, but when 
their presence on boards exceeds a certain threshold, CEO pay is positively affected.  
Past research shows that institutional directors are a key mechanism that influences 
the decision-making bodies, but not all are equally willing or able to serve this function 
(Almazán et al., 2005). Accordingly, this evidence argues that business relationships with the 
company on whose boards they sit may have an effect on the preferences and incentives of 
the institutional directors to control corporate decisions. Thus, institutional directors cannot 
be considered a uniform group, owing to their different incentives, abilities and attitudes to 
engage in corporate governance (Almazán et al., 2005; Cornett, Marcus, Saunders, & 
Tehranian, 2007; Jara-Bertín, López-Iturriaga, & López de Foronda, 2012; López-Iturriaga, 
García-Meca, & Tejerina-Gaite, 2015). Along with this line, most authors identify two groups 
of directors, according to their business goals: pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant 
institutional directors (Bhattacharya & Graham, 2007; Dong & Ozkan, 2008).  
Pressure-sensitive institutional directors (banks and insurance companies) represent 
investors who have existing or potential business ties with firms where they invest. They 
attempt to do business with firms; therefore, they are subject to managerial pressure and have 
limitations in monitoring the organizations. On the other hand, pressure-resistant institutional 
directors (mutual funds, investment funds, pension funds, and venture capital firms) have no 
business links with firms where their represented invest. They do not face any monitoring 
obstacles, have a more independent position in the firm, and can successfully monitor 
corporate managers (Jara-Bertín et al., 2012; Pucheta-Martínez & García-Meca, 2014).  
Pressure-sensitive institutional directors may lack the incentives or ability to 
effectively monitor managers, although they can mitigate agency conflict through higher 
levels of executive compensation (Almazán et al., 2005; Khan et al., 2005). As mentioned 
before, increases of CEO pay may result in a better firm performance and, thus, both 
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shareholders and managers might align their interests. Pressure-sensitive investors are in a 
dependent position from the companies since they maintain commercial ties and, therefore, 
they will be likely to increase CEO compensation in order to keep and secure their business 
ties (David, Kochar, & Levitas, 1998). They have strict fiduciary standards and prefer short-
term earnings, so they prefer to invest in short-term horizons. López-Iturriaga et al. (2015) 
and Shin and Seo (2011) report a positive association between pressure-sensitive institutional 
directors and CEO compensation. However, when pressure-sensitive institutional directors 
reach a certain level, they could develop a more active role in the governance of firms, which 
could negatively affect CEO compensation. In this case, large shareholders, like banks or 
insurance companies, could create coalitions between them in order to take out private 
benefits (Jara-Bertín, López-Iturriaga, & López de Foronda, 2008). Thus, as there is a greater 
presence of pressure-sensitive directors on boards, they might be interested in preventing 
agreements between themselves and CEOs because, when they act as shareholders and 
lenders, they may perform more monitoring activities (De Andrés, Azofra, & Tejerina, 2010) 
in order to mitigate the opportunistic behavior of the new controlling shareholders (Mahrt-
Smith, 2006). According to the above arguments, as the presence of pressure-sensitive 
institutional directors on boards grows, the monitoring role played by them to contest the 
power of other large shareholders also grows (Gomes & Novaes, 2005) and, therefore, it may 
be used to monitor CEO decisions and to prevent the CEO from colluding with other 
pressure-sensitive institutional directors. Consequently, pressure-sensitive institutional 
directors may be more likely to decrease CEO compensation. In this line, the combination of 
the collusion and contest hypotheses may support a nonlinear relationship between pressure-
sensitive institutional directors and CEO compensation. This quadratic relationship is 
supported by De Andrés et al. (2010) and Morck, Nakamura and Shivdasani (2000), who 
examined the association between pressure-sensitive institutional ownership and corporate 
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performance. As addressed in the institutional directorship hypothesis, we can draw on the 
theory of optimal distinctiveness of Brewer (1991) to give a stronger support to the nonlinear 
correlation between pressure-sensitive women directors and CEO pay.  
Pressure-resistant institutional directors are less likely to suffer from conflicts of 
interest arising from business relationships, and can serve as a monitoring mechanism in 
mitigating agency problems between shareholders and managers (Bhattacharya & Graham, 
2007; Cornett et al., 2007). In this vein, they have a long-term horizon and, therefore, prefer 
to invest in firms with an international strategy (Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003). 
Thus, pressure-resistant institutional directors on boards are more likely to actively be 
involved in monitoring, and may influence CEO pay by reducing total compensation (López-
Iturriaga et al., 2015). David et al. (1998), Dong and Ozkan (2008) and Shin and Seo (2011) 
demonstrate a negative association between pressure-resistant institutional ownership and 
CEO compensation. Nevertheless, Chowdhury and Wang (2009) find a positive relationship 
between pressure-resistant institutional investors and CEO compensation. According to this 
evidence, pressure-resistant investors may be less efficient in the monitoring role and, 
therefore, CEOs may achieve more control in the determination of his/her compensation. 
Thus, extending the arguments discussed in the first hypothesis to pressure-resistant female 
directors, the relation between them and CEO compensation will be negative to some extent, 
but when pressure-resistant female directors reach a certain point, both interest conflicts and 
coordination problems may appear between pressure-resistant female directors, which may be 
exploited by CEOs to obtain, for example, greater compensation. Given that we expect the 
same behavior for pressure-resistant female directors than for institutional female directors as 
a whole, a deeper explanation for the nonlinear association, particularly quadratic, between 
pressure-resistant women directors and CEO pay can be found in the hypothesis focused on 
institutional women directors, based on Brewer’s approach (1991). 
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To our best knowledge, there is no previous evidence that examines the effect that 
pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive female directors on boards have on CEO 
compensation. Thus, based on the above arguments, we predict a nonlinear relationship, 
concretely quadratic, between pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive institutional female 
directors on boards and CEO pay. Thus, we posit the following hypotheses:  
H2: CEO pay is positively affected by pressure-sensitive women directors on boards, but 
when their presence on boards exceeds a certain threshold, CEO pay is negatively 
affected.  
H3: CEO pay is negatively affected by pressure-resistant women directors on boards, but 




The study is based on the total population of non-financial listed firms in Spain for the 
period from 2010 to 2014. Financial companies have been excluded both because they are 
under special scrutiny by financial authorities that constrain the role of their board of 
directors and because of their special accounting practices. The data were collected from the 
Public Register of the Spanish Securities Market Commission (CNMV), from the "Sistemas 
de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos" (SABI) database and corporate governance and directors’ 
remuneration reports that companies have had to disclose annually since 2003 and 2011, 
respectively. The annual reports disclose the data for two consecutive years.  
We have built an unbalanced panel of 553 firm-year observations. Nevertheless, the 
estimations based on unbalanced panels are as reliable as those based on balanced panels 





The dependent variable CEO compensation is defined as CEO_COMP, and is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of CEO’s total compensation, which includes salary, 
allowances, compensation for attending committees and any other monetary benefits 
including stock options. Authors such as Croci et al. (2012) and Reddy et al. (2015), among 
others, have also employed the logarithm of CEO’s total compensation.  
We have also used several independent variables. The percentage of institutional 
female directors is defined as INST_WOM. We define SENSIT_WOM as the proportion of 
female directors who are representative of pressure-sensitive institutional investors and 
RESIST_WOM as the proportion of female directors who are representative of pressure-
resistant institutional investors. INST_WOM2, SENSIT_WOM2 and RESIST_WOM2 are 
defined as the square of the proportion of institutional female directors on boards, of the 
proportion of pressure-sensitive institutional female directors and pressure-sensitive 
institutional investors and of the proportion of pressure-resistant institutional female directors 
(Navissi & Naiker, 2006), respectively.  
We control for a set of governance and financial variables that could have a 
significant impact on CEO compensation: when the chairperson of the board and CEO are the 
same person (CEO_DUALITY), the length of time for which the CEO has performed this 
role (CEO_TENURE), board independence (INDP), management ownership (OWNMAN), 
profitability (ROA), firm size (SIZE), the leverage of level of the firms (LEV) and two 
dummy variables in order to control whether there is a systematic difference between 
pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant women directors (DUM_FEM_SENSIT and 
DUM_FEM_RESIST). Finally, we also consider year and firm fixed effects to control for 
year- and firm-specific effects on CEO compensation. A summary of all the variables is 
provided in Table 1. 
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Insert Table 1 about here> 
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the mean, the median, the standard error, and the 10th and 90th 
percentiles of the main variables. As can be seen in Table 2, CEO compensation is, on 
average, 4.252 (the natural logarithm of a CEO’s total compensation expressed in Euros). 
Institutional female directors account for 7.85%, pressure-sensitive institutional female 
directors represent 2.59% and pressure-resistant institutional female directors 5.26%. The 
proportion of independent directors on the boards is, on average, 33.38%, manager ownership 
represents 27.73%, CEO duality accounts for 32% and CEO tenure, on average, is 1.71 years. 
The return on assets is -1.45%, the level of leverage is, on average, 57.33% and the mean size 
of the firm is 13.053 (log of the total assets).  
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
To test for multicollinearity, we have calculated the Pearson correlation matrix. 
However, for the sake of brevity, the findings are not reported. The correlation between most 
pairs is low, generally below 0.3. Thus, we conclude that multicollinearity is not a problem.  
Multivariate analysis 
Table 3 offers the results of the linear regression for institutional, pressure-sensitive 
and pressure-resistant female directors on boards. As can be observed, we built three models.  
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
In Model 1, the variable denoting institutional female directors on boards in linear 
(INST_WOM) and nonlinear ways (INST_WOM2), concretely quadratic, presents the 
expected signs and is statistically significant. Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis 1, 
since the proportion of institutional female directors impacts negatively CEO compensation, 
but when the percentage of institutional female directors reaches a certain level, it is 
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positively affected. This quadratic relation is supported by two opposite premises: 
institutional female directors may monitor decisions and activities in order to reduce CEO 
compensation (e.g., Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2007; Ning, Hu., & Garza-Gómez, 2015; Sánchez-
Marín, Baixauli-Soler, & Lucas-Pérez, 2011), but when their presence on boards reaches a 
certain threshold, they may collude with CEOs, increasing CEO compensation (Croci et al., 
2012; Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, & Murphy, 2012). Thus, consistent with our results, 
previous research also supports a non-linear relation between institutional directors and firm 
performance; therefore, this evidence suggests that, at low levels, the contest hypothesis 
prevails, since institutional female directors reduce CEO compensation. However, at high 
levels, the collusion hypothesis prevails, since they may work with CEOs to achieve their 
own aims and, therefore, they will be more proactive to increase CEO compensation. 
Contrary to our predictions, and as shown in Model 2, the variable pressure-sensitive 
institutional female directors on boards presents a linear (SENSIT_WOM) and nonlinear 
(SENSIT_WOM2) relation, exhibiting the non-expected signs. Additionally, they are not 
statistically significant and, consequently, we cannot accept the hypothesis 2. This finding 
suggests that, contrary to our predictions, CEO compensation does not grow with increases in 
pressure-sensitive institutional female directors on boards up to a point, beyond which, 
further increases in pressure-sensitive institutional female directors are not associated with 
decreases in CEO compensation.  
In Model 3, we observe that the variables representing pressure-resistant institutional 
female directors on boards, in linear (RESIST_WOM) and nonlinear (RESIST_WOM2) 
ways, provide the expected signs and are statistically significant. Thus, the third hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. This result supports the notion that the proportion of pressure-resistant 
institutional female directors affects negatively CEO compensation, but when the proportion 
of pressure-resistant institutional female directors reaches a certain level, they have a positive 
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effect on CEO compensation. Under this assumption, we extend the literature regarding 
pressure-resistant female directors and CEO compensation. Concretely, a moderate level of 
pressure-resistant female directors on corporate boards reduces CEO compensation, whereas 
an excessive presence of pressure-resistant female directors on boards increases CEO pay. 
This result is also supported by Jara-Bertín et al. (2012), Jiao and Ye (2013) and Navissi and 
Naiker (2006), who demonstrate a non-linear relationship between pressure-resistant 
institutional directors and firm performance.  
Regarding the control variables, we can observe that duality in the position of CEO 
and chairperson of the board (CEO_DUALITY), tenure of CEO (CEO_TENURE), 
ownership of managers (OWNMAN), firm size (SIZE) and leverage (LEV) present a positive 
sign, as predicted, and they are statistically significant. The rest of control variable are 
insignificant.  
We have also considered endogeneity concerns between institutional female directors 
and CEO compensation. This matter is addressed by lagging the independent variables. The 
findings, unreported by the sake of the brevity, are consistent with our main findings.  
Analysis extension 
The difficult situation in Spain has led to listed firms to report losses and, 
consequently, it is likely that companies with losses do not increase CEO compensation. 
Then, in the analysis extension, we remove from the sample companies that report a negative 
return on assets (ROA) in the period of analysis. A positive ROA is an indicator of a better 
firm performance, which may result in an increase of CEO remuneration since a higher firm 
performance can be the outcome of the best management of the CEO, its effort and its talent 
(Gabaix & Landier, 2008). These arguments are consistent with theories focused on the 
interaction between company scale and the demand for CEO talent, getting the most 
determined empirical support in the associated increases in firm performance and CEO 
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compensation. In this line, Faria, Martins and Brandão (2014) find that as firm performance 
(measured as ROA) enhances, CEO compensation is also higher.  
The findings, not provided for the sake of brevity, show that institutional female 
directors on boards influence CEO compensation when their presence reaches a higher level, 
but not when their proportion on the board is low. Furthermore, the findings also reveal that 
CEO compensation decreases at low levels of pressure-resistant institutional female directors, 
but when their presence reaches a certain threshold, further increases in pressure-resistant 
institutional female directors are associated with increases in CEO compensation. On the 
other hand, the results also demonstrate that the proportion of pressure-sensitive institutional 
female directors does not impact CEO pay at any level: low and high. The same analysis has 
been conducted removing companies that report a positive return on assets in the period 
examined. According to the findings, institutional female directors, pressure-resistant and 
pressure-sensitive institutional female directors behave in the same way as when the 
companies report profits. Hence, these results suggest that the financial crisis does not 
significantly impact the relationship between institutional, pressure-sensitive and pressure-
resistant female directors on Spanish boards and CEO compensation. 
Conclusions 
Little attention has been paid to the role of institutional female directors on boards on 
CEO compensation. Thus, the aim of this study is twofold. First, we examine the impact of 
institutional female directors as a whole on boards on CEO compensation. Second, we 
analyse this relationship, differentiating between pressure-sensitive institutional female 
directors and pressure-resistant institutional female directors.  
Our study provides evidence that institutional female directors play an important role 
as a mechanism of corporate governance. Concretely, our paper demonstrates that 
institutional female directors considered a whole and pressure-resistant female directors 
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(represent institutional investors who do not maintain commercial ties with the firm where 
they sit on boards) affect negatively CEO compensation, but when they reach a certain level, 
CEO compensation increases. This finding suggests that as the presence of institutional and 
pressure-resistant women directors on boards increases, CEO pay decreases, in line with the 
monitoring hypothesis. Thus, board structures with low presence of institutional and 
pressure-resistant female directors become an effective mechanism for monitoring CEO pay, 
controlling management team decisions that may benefit it and, therefore, they will not align 
with management decisions regarding pay. However, when the presence of institutional and 
pressure-resistant women directors reaches a critical point, the adding of more institutional 
and pressure-resistant female directors on boards will enhance CEO pay, consistent with the 
entrenchment hypothesis. Therefore, a higher proportion of institutional and pressure-
resistant female directors may imply an entrenchment and, thereby, they will support 
managerial decisions, particularly those relative to compensations. Consequently, board 
structures with higher proportions of institutional women directors become an ineffective 
mechanism for controlling CEO compensation and, thus, they will serve as a device to 
encourage pay. Our results also demonstrate that CEO compensation is not affected by the 
proportion of pressure-sensitive female directors on boards. Thus, the presence of pressure-
sensitive institutional female directors cannot be considered a significant monitoring 
mechanism to influence CEO compensation since they support neither increases nor 
decreases on it. This result is contrary to the view that pressure-sensitive female directors 
would be willing to preserve the commercial relations that their represented maintain with the 
firm where they hold a directorship and, as a result, neither the collusion nor the monitoring 
hypotheses prevail for pressure-sensitive female directors when they have to make a decision 
about CEO pay. The lack of relevant impact of pressure-sensitive institutional female 
directors on CEO pay may be explained by various reasons. First, pressure-sensitive women 
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directors are representing mainly institutional investors such as banks and insurance 
companies with aims different from those of the remainder of institutional investors. As a 
consequence, their incentives, motivations and abilities to oversee CEO compensation might 
not be consistent with those of other institutional investors (Shin & Seo, 2011). Second, 
pressure-sensitive institutional female directors might be more involved in issues relative to 
designing of corporate strategies and finding solutions to problems rather than aligning with 
management team or monitoring management team. Third, the specific composition of 
pressure-sensitive institutional female directors (e.g., represent banks and insurance 
companies) is likely to become more transient investors. Thus, these directors might be 
influenced by the governing bodies in the firm’s strategic decisions. Finally, pressure-
sensitive institutional women directors may be more interested in not using CEO pay as a 
corporate governance mechanism for controlling or aligning with managers, but others 
governance tools, which suggests that corporate governance mechanism are replaceable.  
Our results have different implications for the corporate governance debate. First, the 
results obtained should be useful as an empirical guide for Spanish policymakers, regulators, 
and corporate decision makers concerning female directors. The incorporation of women onto 
boards promotes gender equality and increases the effectiveness of the board by creating 
diversity in the decision-making process. Second, the most important policy implication of 
our study is that, in the current weak corporate governance in Spain, female directors affect 
remuneration policies. Therefore, our results should encourage policymakers to promote a 
more efficient corporate system through the incorporation of female directors. Third, another 
implication that can be derived from this analysis is that institutional female directors cannot 
be considered a homogeneous group because, when they are considered as a whole, they 
behave in one way regarding CEO pay, but when we distinguish them between pressure-
sensitive and pressure-resistant female directors, they do not behave in the same way. Thus, 
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companies should revisit the presence of institutional female directors on boards. Our 
findings are relevant for European countries characterized by weak corporate governance, 
where the most predominant agency conflict is the expropriation of minority shareholder’s 
wealth by large shareholders. Finally, our results also have practical implications for 
managers, shareholders and the remainder of stakeholders since they show that a low or high 
proportion of institutional, pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive women directors on 
boards will determine what board structure is more or less effective mechanism for 
monitoring CEO pay. Board structures made up by low proportions of institutional and 
pressure-resistant women directors females directors act as an effective corporate governance 
mechanism for controlling CEO pay because they will reduce it, while high percentages of 
institutional and pressure-resistant women directors female directors result in ineffective 
device for monitoring CEO compensation since they will enhance it. On the other hand, 
board structures with pressure-sensitive female directors do not have an effect on CEO pay 
and, therefore, one implication of this finding is that their presence on boards may be neither 
effective nor ineffective corporate governance mechanism concerning CEO compensation. 
Beyond the prior findings, past research also recognizes that women's presence on corporate 
boards has direct effect on CEO compensation and, consequently, on the corporate 
governance field. In this sense, female leadership style is characterized by women more 
sympathetic, civilized, conservative, stricter, democratic and sensitive, among others, which 
may help firms in the decision-making process of firms affecting, for instance, CEO 
remuneration, which may result in a better corporate governance.  
The limitations of this study are the following. Firstly, the proportion of institutional 
female directors on boards is limited in Spanish companies, despite recommendations and 
LOIMH (2007). Secondly, this study is based on the Spanish listed firms from 2010 to 2014. 
Our sample excludes industrial companies before 2010 because Spanish listed firms were not 
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obligated to publish the remunerations of the directors until 2011 (disclosing also the data of 
the previous year, 2010). Thirdly, it is possible that there are unknown factors that could 
affect our dependent variable. While we have controlled for as many factors as possible based 
on theory and previous research, empirical and theoretical limitations prevent us from 
knowing whether all of the important influences have been controlled for and addressed. 
We also suggest the following future research avenues. Researchers may study the 
repercussions of institutional female directors on CEO compensation comparing boards and 
remuneration committees.  
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CEO_COMP Natural logarithm of CEO total compensation 
INST_WOM Proportion of institutional female directors on board 
SENSIT_WOM 
Proportion of the board female directors who are representative of pressure-sensitive 
institutional investors 
RESIST_WOM 
Proportion of the board female directors who are representative of pressure-resistant 
institutional investors 
CEO_DUALITY Dummy variable equals to 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and President 
of the board and zero, otherwise 
CEO_TENURE Number of years the CEO has held the firm’s top ranking position 
INDP 
Ratio between the total number of independent directors on board and the total number of 
directors on board 
OWNMAN Proportion of stocks held by directors 
ROA Operate income before interests and taxes over total assets 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
LEV Ratio of book debt to total assets 
DUM_FEM_SEN
SIT 
The multiplication of a female dummy variable with a dummy variable representing 
pressure-sensitive female directors 
DUM_FEM_RES
IST 
The multiplication of a female dummy variable with a dummy variable representing 





















Main Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A. Continuous variables 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. Perc. 10 Perc. 90 
CEO_COMP 553 4.252 5.537 3.184 0.000 7.711 
INST_WOM 553 7.854% 0.000% 8.398% 0.000% 16.667% 
SENSIT_WOM 553 2.590% 0.000% 3.326% 0.000% 7.130% 
RESIST_WOM 553 5.264% 0.000% 8.009% 0.000% 14.286% 
CEO_TENURE 553 1.714 1.000 1.514 0.000 4.000 
INDP 553 33.379% 33.334% 18.511% 11.111% 60.000% 
OWNMAN 553 27.726% 21.193% 27.578% 0.032% 66.900% 
ROA 553 -1.445% 1.584% 55.683% -16.207% 14.533% 
SIZE 553 13.053 13.059 2.095 10.608 15.685 
LEV 553 57.334% 54.149% 46.810% 9.404% 91.554% 
Panel B. Dummies variables 
 % (0)  % (1)  
CEO_DUALITY 68%  32%  
DUM_FEM_SENSIT 95.48%  4.52%  
DUM_FEM_RESIST 69.44%  30.56%  


























Results of the regression for institutional, pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant female directors sit on the 

































RESIST_WOM_BD -   
-10.803* 
(0.096) 




















































DUM_FEM_SENSIT +/-  1.745 
(0.139) 
 











Estimated coefficients (p-value). CEO_PAY is the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation; INST_WOM_BD is the 
proportion of institutional female directors on board; SENSIT_WOM_BD is the proportion of the board female directors 
who are representative of pressure-sensitive institutional investors; RESIST_WOM_BD is the proportion of the board female 
directors who are representative of pressure-resistant institutional investors; CEO_DUALITY equals to 1 if the same person 
serves simultaneously as CEO and President of the board and 0, otherwise; CEO_TENURE is the number of years the CEO 
has held the firm’s top ranking position; INDP_BD is the proportion of independent directors on board; OWNMAN is the 
proportion of stocks held by directors; ROA is the operate income before interests and taxes over total assets; FIRM_SIZE is 
the natural logarithm of total assets and LEV is the ratio of book debt to total assets. Significant at *** for 99 percent 
confidence level, ** for 95 percent and * for 90 percent. 
 
